Bitcoin federations and confederations on EVM. Native BTC stays on a Taproot wallet controlled by FROST threshold signatures; its movements are proven on-chain through a header relay or a zero-knowledge SPV state. Custodians are chosen from ULR holders, and confederation treasuries pay daily income to ULR stakers.
SatoshiFi lets a group of participants hold Bitcoin together without a single custodian and issue fully backed ERC-20 wrappers for it on an EVM network. The bitcoin never leaves Bitcoin: it sits on a Pay-to-Taproot wallet whose key exists only as shares distributed by DKG. Every spend requires a threshold of participants to sign with FROST.
The EVM side does not trust anyone's word about Bitcoin. Deposits and payouts are accepted only with a Merkle proof against a Bitcoin header chain that the contracts verify themselves — either through a proof-of-work header relay or through a zero-knowledge state updated by succinct proofs. Wrapped value is issued only against proven, unspent, sufficiently confirmed outputs, and burned only after the payout transaction is proven on Bitcoin.
Governance is split by purpose. FROST participants authorize operations; custodians — admitted from holders of the ULR governance token — add a second, independent approval for confederation operations; ULR stakers receive the daily income that confederation treasuries pay out.
FROST Schnorr/BIP340 signatures over a Taproot key generated by DKG. No party, operator included, can spend or approve alone.
Proof-of-work header relay or ZK-SPV state, both with canonical-chain, depth and freshness checks before any mint or settlement.
MP tokens per pool and S tokens per federation or confederation. One satoshi equals 1010 base units; principal can never pay miner fees.
Custodian candidates from ULR holders, delegated stakers' votes, and a daily payout of 90% of each treasury's excess over its reserve.
The system is a stack of independent layers. Each one checks its inputs itself instead of trusting the layer above: the deposit registry re-checks Bitcoin proofs, the escrow re-checks the payment, and every participant's client re-checks contracts, plans and Bitcoin data before it signs anything.
| Layer | Responsibility |
|---|---|
| Onboarding & DKG | Signed on-chain invitation, encrypted DKG exchange on a public board, three key ceremonies per deployment |
| Authorization | FROST signing sessions, target-bound operation hashes, custodian approvals |
| Bitcoin verification | Header relay with freshness guard, or ZK-SPV state and adapter; canonicality, depth and Merkle inclusion |
| Issuance | Deposit registry with single-use outpoints and backing accounting; MP minting by mining pools |
| MultiPool | MP aggregation into S tokens, per-pool balances, withdrawal requests |
| Payout | UTXO reservation, public signing plan, FROST Bitcoin signing, escrow settlement by SPV proof |
| Fees & treasury | Wrap/unwrap fees, fee pipeline, confederation treasuries, BTC fee reserve |
| ULR | Governance token, staking, custodian candidates, delegated votes, daily snapshots and payouts |
Phase-timed DKG with encrypted packages published on-chain. No secret is generated or stored on-chain.
Signing sessions bound to a completed DKG result; authorization consumes each approved operation exactly once.
Two interchangeable verification backends behind one proof interface used by every consumer.
Proof-only MP issuance. No owner mint, no discretionary redemption.
Reserve, bind, sign, broadcast and settle a payout without exchanging files between participants.
Shared staking, one treasury per confederation, and a daily FROST-attested custodian snapshot.
MiningPoolV1.mintFromProof consumes the approval and mints exactly satoshis × 1010 MP to the recipients.
Contracts are written in Solidity 0.8.30 and compiled for Osaka with via-IR. Every contract is immutable once deployed: there is no upgrade proxy and no administrator who can change rules later. A new version means a new, separately approved deployment. Large graphs are built by controlled leaf deployers so that each contract stays within the EIP-170 size limit.
| Contract | Purpose |
|---|---|
DKGCoordinator | DKG phases, receipts, public key shares and completed results (purpose, group key, participants, threshold) |
DKGOnchainBoard | Invitation, enrollments, encrypted DKG packages and public intents for every approval |
FROSTCoordinator / FROSTVerifier | Signing sessions bound to a DKG result; aggregate BIP340 verification |
DKGAuthorization | Pins one federation key; turns a finalized session into a single-use approval of one target operation |
FederationFactory / ConfederationFactory | Deploy authorization, pool, S token and, for confederations, CustodianValidator |
CustodianValidator | Active custodian set, custodian approvals, candidate source binding |
MainnetHeaderRelay / MainnetSPVGuard | Bitcoin headers from a reviewed checkpoint; freshness and halt guard for consumers |
ZkBitcoinStateV2 / ZkSpvAdapter | ZK-proven Bitcoin header state with a pinned Groth16 verifier; header materialization |
BitcoinDepositRegistry | Registered wallet scripts, single-use outpoints, backing and wallet-change accounting |
MiningPoolV1 / PoolMpToken | Proof-only MP issuance against deposits or coinbase rewards |
ConfederationMultiPool | MP deposits, S minting, withdrawal requests, fee accrual |
BitcoinBatchRegistry / BitcoinSigningBoard | UTXO reservations and the public payout plan, commitments and signature shares |
BitcoinWithdrawalEscrow | Locks S and MP per request, binds the transaction, settles by SPV proof |
ULRStaking / ULRConfederationTreasury / ULRCustodianSnapshots | Staking and claims, treasury payouts, daily custodian snapshot |
Every privileged action is approved as an exact operation, not as a general permission. The hash binds the target contract, the function selector, the parameters and the target's own nonce:
function hashOperation(
address target,
bytes4 selector,
bytes32 paramsHash,
uint256 nonce
) external view returns (bytes32)
Each target exposes helpers such as getMintOperationHash,
getProcessWithdrawalOperationHash or getBindOperationHash. The approval
cycle is always the same: open a FROST session for the hash, publish a typed intent on the board,
let each participant independently review and sign, finalize, call
authorizeOperation, add custodian approvals where required, and execute. The target
consumes the approval, so it cannot be replayed.
A pool whose payout script is the federation wallet mints MP against coinbase outputs in the same way as against deposits. Coinbase outputs require 100 confirmations to mint and at least 101 before the wallet may spend them.
BTC can move between two independent federation wallets without the source participants taking part in the destination. The source pays and burns its MP; the destination gateway verifies the exact output by SPV together with the source's on-chain payment record and issues local cBTC to the fixed recipient. Later exit uses the destination's custodians only.
Hold and stake ULR. Reaching the candidate threshold (200,000 ULR by default) makes the address a custodian candidate; admission is a separate confederation decision. Any staker receives a share of daily treasury payouts in proportion to stake and may delegate voting to an active custodian without giving up the reward.
Two kinds of wrappers carry bitcoin value; a third token carries governance and income rights. Wrappers are minted only against proven bitcoin and burned only against a proven payout.
| Token | Issued by | Backing and use |
|---|---|---|
| MP (pool token) | MiningPoolV1 through PoolMpToken | Exactly satoshis × 1010 per proven output; freely transferable ERC-20 |
| FS / CS (S tokens) | Federation or confederation MultiPool | Minted for deposited MP net of the wrap fee; redeemable to BTC through the withdrawal flow |
| cBTC | Destination custody gateway | Local wrapper issued after a proven transfer between independent wallets |
| ULR | CustodianDAOToken | 10,000,000 supply minted once, no mint function; governance, custodian candidacy and staking income |
FROST (Flexible Round-Optimized Schnorr Threshold Signatures) is the foundation of custody. The private key never exists in one place: each participant holds a share, and a valid signature needs a threshold of partial signatures. Signatures are plain BIP340 Schnorr signatures, so a Bitcoin node sees an ordinary Taproot key-path spend.
evm_ceremony for federation authorization, conf_ceremony for confederation authorization, btc_ceremony for the Bitcoin spending key. Each phase has a deadline; a missed deadline fails the ceremony instead of leaving it half-done.
DKG results carry a purpose. EVM_AUTH keys approve EVM operations;
BTC_SPEND keys sign Bitcoin transactions. The Bitcoin key never approves EVM
operations, and a payout always needs both: EVM approvals (reserve and bind) and a Bitcoin
signature over exactly the bound transaction.
A Schnorr nonce reused for two messages reveals the key share. Each participant's client writes every nonce and share to an encrypted state and an independent spent journal before publishing, refuses to sign twice with the same nonce, and fails closed if the journal is missing or rolled back. Recovery never consists of deleting state.
Contracts never take a Bitcoin fact on trust. A deposit or a payout counts only with a Merkle proof against a header that the contracts consider canonical, deep enough and fresh. Two backends provide that header state. The choice is made in the signed invitation and is the same for every consumer of a deployment.
MainnetHeaderRelay starts from a reviewed checkpoint at a difficulty-period boundary,
with its exact chainwork and ten predecessors. For every new header it checks the parent link,
proof of work against the target, exact bits within a period and the Bitcoin Core
retarget rule at boundaries, median-time-past and the two-hour future limit. Among competing
branches it selects the heaviest.
MainnetSPVGuard serves proofs only while the relay is not halted and its tip is recent (6 hours by default, at most 2 blocks behind the participants' own nodes).frost-relay-keeper. Anyone may submit; invalid headers revert.
The ZK backend replaces header-by-header submission with succinct proofs. A RISC Zero guest runs
a full Bitcoin header verifier — proof of work, retarget, median time, fork choice by chainwork,
reorg depth and halt — over a batch of headers. The proof is compressed from STARK to Groth16
and accepted on-chain by ZkBitcoinStateV2 with a pinned verifier. One proof updates
the whole header state; deposits and payouts still use ordinary raw transactions and Merkle
branches through ZkSpvAdapter.
| Operation | Required depth |
|---|---|
| Ordinary deposit mint | 6 confirmations (stricter policy allowed) |
| Coinbase reward mint | 100 confirmations |
| Spending a coinbase output, fee-reserve ingress | at least 101 confirmations |
| Payout settlement | 6 confirmations |
| Reorganization followed before halt | up to 100 blocks |
Bitcoin mainnet and testnet4 each have their own relay and their own fixed ZK guest; regtest is supported for integration tests only. The EVM network is chosen independently: a deployment on Sepolia can verify Bitcoin mainnet or testnet4. Mainnet use requires each participant to run a fully synchronized, unpruned Bitcoin Core with transaction index.
A federation is a group of participants holding shares of authorization and Bitcoin keys through DKG. A confederation adds custodians: its operations need a FROST threshold and a custodian threshold for the same operation hash.
FederationFactory and ConfederationFactory adopt a completed
EVM_AUTH DKG and deploy, through controlled leaf deployers, a
DKGAuthorization bound to that result, the MultiPool and its S token, and for a
confederation the CustodianValidator. Changing participants or threshold requires a
new DKG; the contracts reject a manifest change that would not rotate the key. On Ethereum mainnet
factory deployment charges a fee to the project treasury.
The wallet is a single Pay-to-Taproot output key from the BTC_SPEND DKG, spent by key
path with SIGHASH_DEFAULT. Its script is registered in the deposit registry for one
pool. Change always returns to the same wallet; payouts to the wallet's own script are rejected.
| Mode | How the recipient is bound | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Shared wallet + SMP1 | The deposit transaction carries a marker that commits to recipient, pool, network and distribution | Implemented |
| Address per request | The user enters an EVM recipient and receives a unique bc1p… derived from the group key and the request. Everything arriving at it belongs to that recipient; MP is minted to that address | In qualification |
Address-per-request mode works with any wallet or exchange, because ownership no longer depends
on the sender or on extra data in the transaction. It is built on BitcoinAddressRegistry
with an immutable intent, recipient and script per address and a derivation verifier. Addresses
are not issued until the verifier is qualified. In both modes the mint still needs FROST approval
and the contract's own proof checks.
A deployment can be ACTIVE, DRAINING (no new issuance, existing
obligations served), SUSPENDED (temporarily no minting) or COMPROMISED
(terminal). Every transition is a quorum decision and increases a generation counter. A resume
does not revive approvals from an earlier generation. No state moves BTC, releases reservations
or changes a recipient.
ConfederationMultiPool tracks balances per user and per MP token, so S tokens from
one pool cannot redeem another pool's bitcoin. Withdrawal requests lock shares first; burning
happens only on proven settlement, and a cancellation before signing releases the lock.
Backing per outpoint is recorded on-chain. Full reconciliation of wallet UTXOs, pending deposits and token supply against the participants' own Bitcoin Core is a FROST-approved report. A negative or unknown result pauses Bitcoin signing until a reviewed recovery.
Custodians are the second line of approval in a confederation. They do not hold Bitcoin key shares; they independently confirm the same operation hash that FROST participants approved. Custodians are recruited from ULR holders, and ULR stakers decide non-monetary questions by vote.
stake registers the address as a nominee in ULRStaking.
With a 10,000,000 supply and a 200,000 threshold, at most 50 holders can meet the threshold at any time. Admission never changes the FROST DKG and creates no key shares.
A staker may delegate its vote, separately for each confederation, to an active custodian. The custodian votes on the owner's behalf in stakers' decisions but cannot unstake, claim or redirect the owner's income. A removed custodian loses all delegations at once; re-admission does not restore them.
Decisions are opened by confederation FROST approval and weighted by stake eligible on the last completed UTC day, so stake added after creation does not change the weight. Quorum counts for, against and abstain; a decision passes when quorum is met and votes for exceed votes against. Results are recorded but do not execute anything: treasury spending, custodian changes and Bitcoin operations always need their own approvals.
Every confederation has one ULRConfederationTreasury holding a single USD stablecoin
— the same token that ULRStaking pays out. Realized fee income is converted into that
stablecoin and routed to the treasury. Once a day the treasury pays the staking contract a share
of its excess over a reserve floor; stakers then claim pro rata.
R = reserve floor (default $1,000)
b = payout share (default 90%)
T = treasury stablecoin balance at payout
C = ULR of this confederation's custodians in the daily snapshot
G = ULR of all custodians in the system in the same snapshot
payout = floor( (T − R) × b × C / G ) if T > R, C > 0, G > 0
payout = 0 otherwise
Example with defaults: treasury $11,000, this confederation's custodians hold 600,000 of the system's 1,000,000 custodian ULR. Payout = $10,000 × 90% × 60% = $5,400; $5,600 stays in the treasury. The reserve, the undistributed 10% and the part outside the custodian share remain in the treasury and take part in the next day's calculation. A missed day is not a debt: only the previous day can be paid, once.
unstake returns ULR immediately. Income is counted by full UTC days; stake added after 00:00 participates from the next day.claim(days) pays floor(dayReward × eligibleStake / totalEligible) minus what was already claimed. Late payments for a day can be claimed later.Protocol fees are charged in wrapped value and end up, once realized, in the confederation treasury. Bitcoin miner fees are a separate cost paid from bitcoin that backs no wrapper. Fee parameters are fixed in the invitation and changed only by FROST plus custodian approval.
amount × bps / 10000, or dynamic minFee + amount × coeffBps / 10000, capped at the amount.FederationNFTModifier tokens with expiry and volume limits reduce the fee; the contract checks ownership and consumes volume.claimFees releases accrued MP under FROST and custodian approval.
PoolFeePipeline converts the actual tokens into the payout stablecoin through a funded converter.
ULRConfederationTreasury.
Factory deployment fees are separate: on Ethereum mainnet they go through the project router to the project treasury.
BitcoinFeeReserve tracks the free fee reserve: available = free − locked − unbound promises. External donors can top it up with a proven, consented Taproot payment.Security comes from independent checks that an attacker would have to defeat at the same time. When a check cannot be completed, the system stops instead of guessing: an unknown state is never treated as a healthy one.
No single party holds a usable key. Spending and approvals need a FROST threshold.
Approvals bind target, function, parameters and nonce, and are consumed on use.
Confederation operations also need custodians admitted from ULR holders.
Relay or ZK state with proof of work, depth, freshness and a permanent halt on deep reorgs.
Single-use outpoints, exact minting, principal never pays fees, burn only after proven payout.
Each signer pins the registry, checks contract provenance, plans and UTXOs against its own Bitcoin Core.
Encrypted state plus independent spent journal; no nonce reuse, fail closed on rollback.
No upgrade proxy and no administrator reset. Halt and terminal states cannot be undone silently.
| Risk | Mitigation and residual risk |
|---|---|
| Compromise of key shares | Threshold signing, geographic distribution, custody states down to COMPROMISED; above the threshold the wallet is at risk |
| Stalled relay or ZK updates | Freshness checks block minting and settlement; this costs liveness, not funds. Keepers and workers must run continuously |
| Deep Bitcoin reorganization | Relay halts permanently above 100 blocks; the ZK worker blocks its own work locally, without a guaranteed global on-chain halt |
| Faulty RPC or provider outage | Clients verify against their own Bitcoin Core; an unconfirmed observation pauses that participant's signing until reviewed |
| Snapshot manipulation | FROST-attested daily snapshot; inventory completeness is an attestation, and short-term borrowing of ULR around midnight is not excluded |
| Off-chain conversion of fees | Explicit approvals with minimum output for each conversion; the converter itself must be reviewed |
| Contract defects | Contracts cannot be patched in place; a fix needs a new deployment and migration of obligations |
BTCyield is a product layer on top of SatoshiFi infrastructure. SatoshiFi provides cross-chain wrapping and custodial infrastructure through FROST. Yield placement into Yield Basis and Silo Finance is executed directly by the SatoshiFi team, under a joint-decision manager multisig.
Risk: minimal. Full BTC control. Create your own confederation and earn 2.5% APY on all capital staked in it — even without staking any BTC of your own. Stake your own BTC as well and earn an additional 7% APY on your own stake, on top of the 2.5% you keep earning on third-party capital. Participants remain owners of their bitcoins. The custodian algorithmically cannot block withdrawal of burned wrappers — their job is solely to defend against key compromise.
Risk: medium. Rent from the entire system TVL. Wrap BTC into sBTC — SatoshiFi's own decentralized founders' wrapper, free of compliance screening and blocklists — and provide liquidity directly into Yield Basis and Silo Finance. Internally, the manager multisig also maintains a cbBTC/sBTC pair on Yield Basis to manage the peg semi-automatically, topping up liquidity when needed; this is a backend mechanic, not the wrapper you receive. You earn against the full system TVL — all confederations combined.
Risk: strategic. Pro-rata participation. ULR stakers receive daily payouts from every connected confederation treasury: 90% of the treasury's excess over its $1,000 reserve, weighted by the share of ULR its custodians hold. Holders of 200,000 ULR can become custodian candidates.
| Strategy | Platform | Target yield |
|---|---|---|
| sBTC peg management (internal) | Yield Basis + manager multisig | Base layer + fees |
| cyb-sBTC vaults | Yield Basis | 2–3% APY |
| sBTC lending | Silo Finance | 4–5% APY |
| yb-token collateral → crvUSD | Silo Finance | Leverage |
| Stablecoin deposit | Silo Finance | from 4% APY |
Thresholds, reserve floor and payout share are launch parameters; the figures above are defaults. Income is counted by full UTC days, and there is no premium for early entry or penalty for exit. See Chapter 10 for the exact formula.
| Confederation | Yield|Loan Stream | ULR staking | |
|---|---|---|---|
| BTC control | Full | Partial (wrapped) | Not required |
| Target yield | 2.5% + 7% APY (creator) | 4–5% APY | Pro-rata treasury income |
| Risk level | Minimal | Medium | Strategic |
| Minimum entry | 3+ participants | BTC for wrapping | ULR stake |
| Income type | Creator income | Rent from TVL | Daily, variable |
Every component below is implemented in code. The status column shows how far it has been proven outside local tests.
| Component | Status |
|---|---|
| On-chain onboarding, DKG, FROST approvals | Tested on Sepolia |
| Header relay on Bitcoin mainnet, deposit, mint, S tokens, withdrawal and settlement | Tested on Sepolia with real BTC — full BTC → MP → S → BTC cycle, October 2026 |
| ZK-SPV state, local proving, Groth16 verification | Local proofs accepted — Sepolia contour with Bitcoin testnet4 is next |
| ULR staking, treasuries, candidates, delegated voting | Implemented, local tests |
| Address-per-request deposits | In qualification — addresses are not issued yet |
| BTC fee reserve, personal fee credits, custody transfer | Implemented, local tests |
| Independent external audit of the current version | Pending |
bc1p… addresses.
Earlier versions of this paper described pool reward calculators (PPS, FPPS, PPLNS, Score), Stratum share oracles with staking and slashing, hashrate rental, and support for Dogecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Litecoin. These are not part of the current deployment profile and remain research directions.
MiningPoolV1 against a proven Bitcoin output; 1010 base units per satoshi.ULRConfederationTreasury: one per confederation, holds the payout stablecoin and pays stakers daily.ACTIVE, DRAINING, SUSPENDED, COMPROMISED: quorum-controlled issuance status of a deployment.bitcoin-da header verifier, with pinned corrections — ZK guest
Smart contract code and documentation are distributed under the MIT license
(SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT). Some dependencies of the ZK proving toolchain are
distributed under GPL terms; the license of a complete prover build follows its components and
is not automatically MIT.